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I. DOES/SHOULD THE SITE OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS MATER?
It is possible to envisage an ideal world in which the country or place in
which a particular arbitration is held makes no difference to the legal
principles applied or the procedure followed. In such a world, the arbi-
tral tribunal would be guided by the agreement of the parties, or failing
such agreement, by its own judgement; it would decide the substantive
matters in issue before it on the basis of the applicable law or legal
rules or, if the parties so wished, ex aequo et bono;' and it would make
an award which was enforceable on the same conditions in any state in
which the losing party had assets. Moreover, its award would be the
same, uninfluenced by national laws or attitudes of mind, in whichever
state the arbitral tribunal happened to sit for the purpose of conducting
arbitration.2
As the popularity of international commercial arbitration continues
to spread,3 it appears that the time has come again to ask the question of
whether the traditional goals of private systems of dispute resolution are
or should be governed by systems of national law. 4 Because every arbi-
tral proceeding takes place somewhere, and is enforced somewhere, it is
1 "[I]n justice and fairness; according to what is just and good; according to equity
and conscience." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 557 (6 h ed. 1990).
2 ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCiAL ARBITRATION 77 (2nd ed. 1991).
3 See Christine Lecuyer-Thieffry & Patrick Thieffry, Negotiating Settlement of Dis-
putes Provisions in International Business Contracts: Recent Developments in Arbitra-
tion and Other Processes, 45 Bus. LAW. 577, 577-81 (1990).
4 The debate is decades old - should parties engaged in binding alternative dispute
resolution be free to unfetter themselves from the legal norms of any particular state? For
the basic context of the "de-localization" debate, see William W. Park, The Lex Loci
Arbitri, 32 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 21 (1983). See also Jan Paulsson, De-localisation of
International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it Matters, 32 INT'L& COMP. L.Q.
53 (1983) (putting Professor Park's examination of the lex loci arbitri and international
commercial arbitration in the perspective of practice and principle); see generally Jan
Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin,
30 INT'L& COMP. L. Q. 358 (1981).
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presumed that these proceedings and awards are governed by the laws of
the states where those activities take place. The goals of state laws on
privatized dispute resolution would thus have a direct impact on private
6parties' desire for certainty.
This Note will examine the continuing state of the trend toward "a-
national" or "de-localized" international commercial arbitration in
Europe. Section I will re-examine the arguments for and against the lo-
calization of arbitral proceedings in general. Section II will look for evi-
dence of the movement toward de-localized arbitration as found in inter-
national arbitral conventions and the United Nations Commission on
Trade Law (UNICTRAL) Model Law. Section III will review selected
national arbitration laws of European nations for this trend. Section IV
will examine apparent conflicts between the trend toward arbitral de-
localization and the declared objectives and policies of the European Un-
ion. This section will discuss the interplay between national and E.U.
policy objectives, demonstrating an apparent and surprising limit to the
ability of E.U. Member States to completely de-localize arbitral proceed-
ings.
II. THE DE-LOCALIZATION DEBATE- WHEN DoEs NATIONAL LAW
MAT=ER?
The underlying question beneath the issue of forum-specific arbitra-
tion law is whether, in the name of party autonomy7 and seeking higher
levels of certainty, parties should be completely free to choose the forum,
procedure, and substantive rules of an arbitral proceeding, without limita-
tion by national legislation A good starting point in addressing this
question is the debate started in the 1980s, which sets out the analysis in
5 See W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBI-
TRATION 443 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing traditional constraints on the choice of law of the
arbitration (lex arbiti)).
6 For example, eliminating or reducing "unintended effects of unforeseen peculiari-
ties of the municipal law of the place where a dispute happens to be heard." Jan Paul-
ssen, The Extent of Independence of International Arbitration from the Law of the Situs,
in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 141,141-42 (Julian D.M.
Lew ed., 1986).
7 Described by Professor Nygh as "a supra-national right." Peter Nygh, Choice of
and Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 24 F. INT'L, 1, 2 (1997).
& Becoming in effect, an "a-national arbitration." See Hans Smit, A-NationalArbitra-
tion, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 631 (1989).
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terms of whether arbitral proceedings are, or should be, "localized" or
"de-localized.'"9
The debate today is less likely to focus on whether it should matter
where an arbitration takes place. Instead, the question today is whether it
does matter. Issues of the stability, the level of infrastructure, travel time,
and the available populace of arbitrators all have an impact on the choice
of forum; but do the legal norms of a particular forum state, or even di-
rect statutory provisions regarding arbitration matter? 0 The apparent an-
swer is no. The answer is less definite, however, if one views the last
several decades as a gradual evolution toward a more tangible system of
private international law promoted by the legislative action of nations
and driven by increasingly sophisticated disputants in international com-
mercial markets. The trend in Europe is most instructive in this regard,
due in part to the activities of independent fora I I sited there, as well as
the growth ofProgressive new European national laws adopted in the last
two decades.'
Typically, national legislation becomes a factor during the enforce-
ment of an arbitral award.1 3 Enforceability arguments tend to favor de-
9 See generally Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 3. This debate is familiar
enough to the scholarly community to warrant at least a subchapter or topic heading in
any respectable book on international commercial arbitration. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN
BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: DESIGNING
PROCEDURES FOR EFFECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 56-57 (1996); WILLIAM W. PARK,
INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 126-27 (1995); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 2, at
5.
10 See, e.g., UNC1TRAL NOTES ON ORGANIZING ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS § 3(a)[22],
at 9, U.N. Sales No. E. 97.v.ll (1996).
[V]arious factual and legal factors influence the choice of the place of arbitration,
and their relative importance varies from case to case. Among the more prominent
factors are: (a) suitability of the law on arbitral procedure of the place of arbitra-
tion; (b) whether there is a multilateral or bilateral treaty on enforcement of arbi-
tral awards between the State where the arbitration takes place and the State or
States where the award may have to be enforced; (c) convenience of the parties
and the arbitrators, including the travel distances; (d) availability and cost of sup-
port services needed; and (e) location of the subject-matter in dispute and prox-
imity of the evidence.
Id.
E.g., the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International
Arbitration, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
12 See infra, section Mfl.
13 See MARK HULEATT-JAMES & NICHOLAS GOULD, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK 7 (1996).
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localization of disputes, giving arbitral awards a currency outside of the
forum state or insulating them from the laws of that state. 14 In the eyes of
the de-localist, a nation's willingness to nullify an award frustrates the
objectives of autonomous international commercial arbitration - after
crafting the arbitral proceeding and engaging in a generally time-
consuming and expensive endeavor, the winners might find themselves
in a national court, starting over from scratch.'
5
Meanwhile, the interests of a nation or a third-party in the outcome
of the dispute will often mandate some form of intervention.16 For in-
stance, assuming that the typical power-disparity problem is best charac-
terized as a third-party problem, the judicial imperative to protect the
weaker party would go unapplied under the de-localist approach, leaving
subsequent parties subject to an essentially hidden risk.17
At least theoretically, all arbitration is "firmly anchored in a definite
legal system which will both assist and, to some degree, control it."18
Municipal law, or the lex loci arbitri9 is always in place, serving as a
backdrop to the private proceeding. If the parties fail to select substantive
or procedural law, the lex loci arbitri will often be applied by the arbitra-
tor.20 Even when the parties have selected procedural and substantive
14 See William W. Park, Text and Context in International Dispute Resolution, 15
B.U. INTLL.J. 191, 210 (1997).
15 See generally Shirin Philipp, Note, Is the Supreme Court Bucking the Trend? First
Options v. Kaplan in Light of European Reform Initiatives in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U.
INTL L.J. 119 (1996) (arguing that more legal authority is needed to make arbitration
decisions binding).
16 Such "mandatory rules" or "rules that cannot be contracted around" are typically
found under the umbrella of a state's "public policy." See Yves Derains, Public Policy
and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE
ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 227, 242-43 (Pieter Sanders
ed., 1986) (discussing the public policy to adopt mandatory rules and distinguishing be-
tween mandatory rules of the forum and foreign mandatory rules).
17 Of arguably equal importance, the jurisprudence of the state goes uninformed as to
the existence of the arbitrated issue. William W. Park, National Law and Commercial
Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV.
647, 674 (1989).
1 See generally, e.g., REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 2.
19 The law of the "seat" of the arbitration.
2 Though in these circumstances it will not always be the law of the state where the
arbitration occurs. See, e.g., John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitrations in the Wake of Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 59, 99 (1997).
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law, the lex loci arbitri plays an important role, as it will provide the
loser with possible defenses to the proceedings or the award.2y
Since the inception of the de-localization debate, which took place
shortly after the adoption of the English Arbitration Act of 1979,2 na-
tions around the world have adopted more progressive (i.e., de-localized)
arbitration models? 3 Looking within Europe, this trend is especially evi-
dent. The popular argument made in favor of de-localized legislation is
that the higher the level of party autonomy supported by the forum, the
more attractive the forum state will be to parties wishing to conduct
business there.24
Two questions arise from this contention, however: (1) whether
complete party autonomy is always in the best interests of the parties,
and (2) whether the adoption of de-localized arbitral legislation creates a
constellation of fora that are governed by "international," or supra-
national policy objectives - e.g., those of the European Union. If the lat-
ter question is answered in the affirmative, it would seem logical that
E.U. Member States have de-localized arbitration laws, assured that (if
only theoretically) international community norms will still provide a
safety net, at least in terms of common objectives of the Member States.
If this supposition is true, then it might be legitimate to declare that arbi-
tration has gone from localized, to de-localized, to a new form of local-
ization, where Europe becomes the new locus arbitri, and pan-European
legal norms (both new and old) become the lex loci arbitri.
Still, no trend, particularly expressed across a conglomeration of fif-
teen nations, can be absolutely consistent. If one is to ask, "does it matter
where you arbitrate in Europe?," the answer is probably yes.25 At a mini-
mum, all European nations have not subscribed to complete de-
localization. Further, interpretations of the meaning of enforcement de-
fenses accepted by the popular conventions on that topic vary. "Public
21 See, e.g., HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 13, at 7 (enumerating a number
procedural and enforcement defenses, including non-arbitrability of the dispute, lack of
capacity to arbitrate, or serious mistakes of fact or law contributing to an improper
award).
22 Arbitration Act 1979, S.I. 1979, No. 750.
23 The 1979 act was viewed as a vast, although incomplete, improvement to the prior
British arbitration law, due primarily to its effect of limiting intervention by the courts.
See Symposium, Comment, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy Checks
on U.S. and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of Control?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1661,
1682 (1991) [hereinafter Relaxation of Inarbitrability].
24 See Park, supra note 4, at 37-38.
2 Even putting aside logistical arguments (e.g., infrastructure, availability of arbitra-
tors, travel and communications considerations, etc. for the purposes of this evaluation).
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policy," and "abitrability" mean different things in different nations.
Thus, it makes sense to plot the Member States of the European Union
along the localized/de-localized spectrum, in the hope that both the par-
ties who seek maximum autonomy and those who seek the safety net of
national protection can make an informed choice. Meanwhile, in plotting
this curve, parties must acknowledge that the European Union has been
relatively and uncharacteristically reticent regarding what appears to be
its role as the ultimate terminus of the de-localization movement, making
it difficult to predict when and where E.U. policy will serve as a supra-
national ambit to party autonomy.
A. Why Localize?
Arguments for stringent national control of arbitral proceedings look
primarily to state objectives of justice and third-party control.26 Thus, it
is argued that, "it is in the highest interest of the State... to maintain the
principle of judicial review of arbitration not only to develop the law, but
also to ensure the administration of justice and thus to avoid the risk of
arbitrariness." 27
Though the benefits of international commercial arbitration are
thought by many to be irrefutable, there are a number of at least theoreti-
cal pitfalls awaiting parties that prefer to engage in a system of privatized
justice.28 The tension caused by the inherent autonomy of systems of pri-
vatized judicial systems and the apparent need for these systems to be
controlled by, and accountable to, public systems of justice was elo-
quently characterized in Owen Fiss' classic article, Against Settlement.'9
The primary question is whether the goals of parties trump the public
interest in objective (or at least national) justice. 3° Issues of power dis-
26 See, e.g., Park, supra note 4, at 51.
27 F.A. Mann, Private Arbitration and Public Policy, 4 CIV. JUST. Q. 257,267 (1985).
2 See, e.g., Philipp, supra note 15, at 120.
2 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (dis-
cussing the tensions within the American court system and private alternative dispute
resolution). Professor Fiss states:
[The purpose of adjudication should be understood in broader terms. Adjudication
uses public resources, and employs not strangers chosen by the parties but public
officials chosen by a process in which the public participates. These officials, like
members of the legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been
defined and conferred by public law, not by private party agreement.
Id. at 1085.
30 See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICA-
TION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 107-08 (1992). Such questions are
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parities between the parties, impacts on third parties, 31 and the benefits of
publicized decisions 32 are generally cited reasons countering arguments
for privatized justice. More generally, the concern can be summarized as
one of "fairness" '33 - to both the parties and the state.34 These concerns
are exacerbated by the fact that most commercial arbitration is binding, 35
and no substantive review of the award may be available to the loser.36
1. Enter National Laws Governing Arbitration
A nation's lex loci arbitri will often control the legal capacity of par-
ties to arbitrate, the validity of the arbitral proceedings (including the
substantive "arbitrability" of the dispute), the extent of the arbitrator's
jurisdiction, and the enforceability of the award.37 In a super-localized
state, arbitral law would provide a number of safety nets for parties, al-
lowing dissatisfied disputants to seek the assistance of relevant national
frequently made more difficult for national courts to decide when the law applied is one
of general principles (e.g., the lex mercatoria).
31 See Park, supra note 4, at 51; William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in Interna-
tional Forum Selection, 30 TEx. INTLL.J. 135, 145, 175 (1995).
32 See Roger Scotton, Arbitration Best Avoided, Bus. INs. (Nov. 19, 1990). Here a
British insurance litigator argues, among other things, how arbitration "can keep deci-
sions important to the market under wraps unless all parties agree to release details." Id.
33 See Relaxation of Inarbitrability, supra note 23, at 1663. Further, even if the par-
ties share an interest in complete control over the resolutions of their disputes, upon what
remedies will they be able to rely if their co-disputant decides to welch on the process,
either by refusing to participate in the proceedings or by failing to comply with the deci-
sion of the arbitrator(s)?
3 Although some questions of fairness may be couched in terms of control and com-
fort with the arbitral process on the part of the judiciary. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 5,
at 448.
35 See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159, art. 53(1) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. "The award shall be binding on
the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those
provided for in [the ICSID] Convention." Id. "In matters governed by this Law, no Court
shall intervene except where so provided by this law." UNICTRAL Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Annex 1 (1985) [hereinafter
UNICTRAL Model Rules].
36 Particularly when judicial review is explicitly limited to procedural issues. See
William W. Park. National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural In-
tegrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 685 (1989).
37 See Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 3, at 599.
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courts.38 Issues of tribunal and personal competence, the willingness for
parties to participate in the arbitral process, remedies for abuses of dis-
cretion on the part of the arbitrators, and nullification of unfair awards
would be provided for in an extremely localized arbitration statute. The
state, then, promotes arbitration, but assumes control of the process to
ensure that national policies and concepts of justice are the foundation
for arbitral proceedings.39
2. Historic Localization
The concept of a lex loci arbitri assumes that, although the parties
may determine the substantive and procedural law to be applied in a dis-
pute, the state controls the proceedings through its arbitration law. 40 A
good example of the localization tradition was the English requirement of
the "special case" or "case stated" procedure in arbitration.4 1 This proce-
dure, dropped by the English Arbitration Act of 1979, not only provided
for the English High Court to hear challenges to any award granted in
England, but also provided for the uniquely English concept that the arbi-
tral proceedings could be challenged before the arbitral forum had
reached a conclusion, termed the "consultative case." 42 This procedure
required the arbitrator to submit questions of law to the High Court, re-
sulting in a remand back to the arbitral forum with instructions on how to
proceed. Further, finalization of the award was also dependent on the ap-
proval of the High Court.43
Following the same logic, localization would also provide that, even
though English law might be the proper law of contract, if Scotland is the
situs of the arbitration, Scottish concepts of a proper determination of the
38 Even in localized proceedings, the question is often how much "assistance" is ap-
propriate. See id. at 615.
39 Park, supra note 4, at 30. "Even if the arbitration involves neither citizens nor in-
terests of the forum State, national courts should ensure the integrity of awards rendered
within national borders." Id.
40 See generally id. at 23 (describing the concept of lex loci arbitri); CRAIG ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 450 (describing lex loci arbitri).
41 See Park, supra note 4, at 33. The procedure was derived from the Common Law
Procedure Act of 1854, and established as a court-sponsored intervention by the Arbitra-
tion Act of 1889. See id. at 33 n.41.
' See id. at 33-34.
43 The High Court was authorized to direct post-award actions, including special
cases, remission, setting aside of awards, and alternate reliefs. See English Arbitration
Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, §§ 21-25 (Eng.).
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dispute should prevail over those of England.44 Similarly, a nation might
validate an award which was nullified under another nation's laws, if it
would be recognizable under its own laws. 45 Therefore extreme localiza-
tion leads to circumstances where the validity of the arbitral proceedings
is dependent on the laws of the forum state and the enforceability of the
award is dependent on the laws of the state where the winner attempts to
collect. Under the perspective of extreme localization, a state retains the
power to control the outcome and effectiveness of arbitral disputes, on
the basis of its own legislative concepts of the validity of the proceed-
ings.
B. Why De-localize?
The primary rationales for de-localization of international commer-
cial arbitration track arguments made in favor of party autonomy. 46 In
general - rather than concerning themselves with abstract notions of jus-
tice in dispute resolution - parties seek complete autonomy, or certainly
very high levels of it, in the arbitration process as the most efficient
means of settling the dispute.47
As the "cornerstone of international arbitration," 4 party autonomy
would seem to equate to predictability, 49 a fundamental rationale for in-
ternational arbitration. 5° Parties want to predict and structure the risks
facing them, and do not want to be hampered with (1) great divergences
in the laws by which their obligations and rights will be judged, or (2)
the possibility that the loser in a dispute will be able to unravel a desir-
44 Such was the decision in 1969, affirmed by the House of Lords. See Whitworth
Estates v. Miller, 2 All E.R. 210, 210 (Eng. C.A.) (1969) (where a Scotch arbitrator re-
fused to "state his case" to the English high court, which the High Court ultimately found
to be a valid exercise of the Scotch lex loci arbitri. (Manchester) Ltd.).
45 As did the French court of appeals in Norsolor v. Pabalk in 1984. See Cass. le civ.,
Oct. 9, 1984, 10 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 101.
46 See, e.g., Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International
Arbitration, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 24, 25 (1997) (equating party autonomy to the commer-
cial freedom to contract).
47 Id.
48 See Gotanda, supra note 20, at 59.
49 See Park, supra note 31, at 135.
50 Actually, the rationales cited most frequently are "certainty" and "predictability,"
but the use of these terms in conjunction with each other seems oxymoronic. If certainty
could be achieved, one would not need predictability. And if predictability is an over-
arching goal, certainty would seem to have been surrendered in advance.
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able outcome by calling on the national courts to interfere with the pro-
ceedings, or perhaps even nullify them.
Since arbitration is a fundamentally legal process, the party auton-
omy is highest where the states do not limit the ability of the parties to
dictate choice of law and forum via contract. 51 By retaining complete
control over choices of procedural and substantive law, arbitrators, and
situs of the proceedings, parties would presumably be able to secure an
outcome that is both mutually agreeable and as predictable as possible.52
The highest levels of party autonomy could then reasonably be expected
in countries where "interference by the local judiciary" would be strictly
limited to the contractual specifications of the parties.53
1. Legislating Autonomy
Party autonomy, however, is grounded in the fact that every arbitral
proceeding takes place somewhere, and the legal and political authorities
of that place are likely to have an interest in the outcome of legal pro-
ceedings affecting the citizenry (personal or corporate) within its juris-
diction. Meanwhile, the balance between party autonomy and vital ju-
ridical interests, 54 public policy, and the pursuit of objectively just out-
comes, 55 does not always pit private interests against those of the state.56
Certain autonomy-limiting measures serve the purpose of protecting the
interests of the parties.
57
51 Parties will not only select the forum and arbitrators, but will also select the proce-
dural and substantive laws governing the resolution of the dispute. See Paulsson, De-
localisation of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 4, at 56.
52 See Julia A. Martin, Note, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in Los
Angeles: The Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REV. 917, 928 (1997) ("Arbitration not only offers the pros-
pect of speedier and cheaper resolution, it also can provide greater predictability
regarding time and cost. Businesses need to know when a dispute is likely to be de-
cided").
53 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 5, at 440.
54 See OKEZIE CHUCKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 202 (1994)
55 See generally Fiss, supra note 29, at 1085-87 (discussing justice rather than peace
in the context of comparing adjudication to dispute resolution).
56 See, e.g., Park supra note 17, at 674.
57 See Martin, supra note 52, at 954.
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As it turns out, states have not only been supportive of enhancing
party autonomy, but they have also been surprisingly willing to relin-
quish court control over the arbitral process if parties so desire.58
2. De-localization via International Accords & Rules
Over the past several decades, the concept of de-localization has had
a dramatic impact on the international accords which govern arbitral pro-
ceedings and awards. Though early conventions clearly favor state con-
trol, latter conventions and declarations demonstrate a willingness to bal-
ance individual objectives against those of the state.
The desire to fix proceedings to the state is evidenced by the lan-
guage of the Geneva Protocol of 1923, whereby the arbitral procedure
and the constitution of the arbitral tribunal were "governed by the will of
the parties and by the law of the country in whose territory the arbitration
takes place." 59 Similar language is found in the Geneva Convention for
the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of September 26, 1927, 6
which had the effect of mandating that the constitution of the tribunal
and the arbitral procedures be in conformity with the law of the place of
arbitration-that it be governed by the lex loci arbitri of the situs.6
A further localization existed in the language of the Geneva conven-
tion which required that an award be final under the laws where the arbi-
tration took place.62 This had the effect of forcing courts to review the
validity of an award - not only in terms of its own domestic law, but also
in terms of the laws of the forum state.63 Thus, the Geneva agreements
prescribed not only a localization, but also a multiple-localization 4 -
58 See Relaxation of Inarbitrability, supra note 23, at 1662-63.
59 Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 258, No. 678.
60 Article l(c) provides that for recognition or enforcement it shall be necessary:
"[t]hat the award has been made by the Arbitral Tribunal provided for in the submission
to arbitration or constituted in the manner agreed upon by the parties and in conformity
with the law governing the arbitration procedure;" Convention on the Execution of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302, No. 2096.
61 See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 9 (1981).
62 See id.
63 Equating to "double exequatur." Id. According to van den Berg, "the drafters of the
New York Convention effected this by providing that the award must be 'binding' on the
parties, avoiding the more demanding term 'final' as used in the Geneva Convention."
(emphasis added). Id.
64 As opposed to Professor Mayer's term multi-localization, referring to de-localized
(independent) arbitration. See Pierre Mayer, The Trend Towards Delocalisation in the
Last 100 Years, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE
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courts were forced to apply the lex arbitri of both the forum state and the
state in which the award would be enforced.
A response to what some felt to be the unworkable nature of these
agreementso came in the form of the 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral awards. 66 The enactment of this
convention marked a turn toward increasingly de-localized international
commercial arbitration. 67 Under the convention, only operational formali-
ties are specified./s Meanwhile, broader procedural provisions still allow
a state to inject its own systemic priorities into proceedings.69 Most im-
portant, though, are the provisions which allow national courts to review
two critical defenses: (1) arbitrability of the subject matter and (2) public
policy of the state.70 These two critical defenses71 present a dovetail be-
LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE 37, 46 (Martin Hunter et al. eds., 1995). The term in the
text refers to simultaneous localization (as in the case of the Geneva agreements). See id.
at 45-46.
6 See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 61, at 9.
6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. Note
that the New York Convention is supplemented by the European Convention on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration of 1961, Feb. 9, 1968, 484 U.N.T.S. 349 (Geneva), but is
only applicable to the nationals of Member States and has enjoyed a very limited effect
on national practice. See generally REDFERN AND HUNTER, supra note 2, at 465-66 (1991)
(discussing the purpose and limitations of this convention).
67 As evidence of its pessimism for arbitration, England did not ratify the New York
Convention until 1975. See Arbitration Act, 1975, S.I. 1975, No. 1662.
6 For instance, the party applying for recognition or enforcement must supply the
authenticated original award or a certified copy thereof. See New York Convention, art.
V(l)(a), supra note 66, at 2520. If the award was not rendered in the enforcing state's
language, a certified translation must also be included. See id.
69 Under the New York Convention, recognition and enforcement may be refused
only if the party against whom recognition or enforcement is sought can prove:
Incapacity of the parties or invalidity of the arbitration agreement,
Improper notice or other lack of due process,
An award beyond the scope of the agreement to arbitrate,
Improper arbitral procedure or composition of the arbitral board, or
That the award has been set aside or suspended or is otherwise not binding.
Id. art. V(I).
70 Recognition or enforcement may be refused if:
The subject-matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration un-
der the law of that country; or
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tween the international conventions and national localization via arbitral
laws (as well as common law decision and administrative regulations).
Questions of arbitrability and public policy vary from nation to na-
tion. The issue of arbitrability is basically a question of competence or
jurisdiction to hear the dispute.72 Classic bars on arbitrability are found in
areas where national priorities are felt to be too important to be left to
privatized justice. 73 In the pre-award stage, the defense would seek to
enjoin the arbitrator from hearing the dispute and reaching a decision on
the merits.74
Most important in the context of the European Union is the 1961
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention). The Brussels
Convention provides (1) uniform rules on jurisdiction7 6 and (2) the rec-
ognition and enforcement in any Member State of judgments rendered by
The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public pol-
icy of that country.
Id. art. V(2).
71 See Julian D.M. Lew, Determination of Arbitrators' Jurisdiction and the Public
Policy Limitations on that Jurisdiction, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 73, 74 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1986).
72 See Relaxation of lnarbitrability, supra note 23, at 1664.
73 See Werner F. Ebke & Mary E. Parker, Foreign Country Money-Judgments and
Arbitral Awards and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: A Conventional Approach, 24 INrrL LAW. 21, 52-53 (1990) (describing U.S. case
law that acknowledged the ever-increasing national dependence on the international
economy). These areas are, among others, anti-trust law, bribery and corruption, cur-
rency controls, boycott, and environmental protection. See Lew, supra note 71, at 78;
Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 2 ARB. INTL 274,
275 (1986); see generally INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK (J.
Stewart McClendon & Rosabel E. Everard eds., 1986)).
74 Though this is generally limited by the doctrine of competence-competence (Kom-
petenz-Kompetenz) referring to the ability of arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction
over a party or dispute. See generally William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Se-
lection: Harmonizing Arbitration and Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 19, 46 (1998). Also, an Injunction might be sought on the basis that the arbitra-
tion agreement was somehow invalid. See Smit, supra note 8, at 636. Some states, (e.g.,
France) interpret competence-competence to preclude injunctive relief for questions of
validity, waiting until a decision has been reached by the arbitrator before hearing the
challenge. See Park, supra note 14, at 202.
75 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, as amended, 1990 O.J. (C 189) [hereinafter Brussels Con-
vention].
76 Id., Title I1.
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the courts of other Member States, with very limited review by the court
in which enforcement is sought.77 Community citizens and artificial per-
sons enjoy the benefits of the Brussels Convention's enforcement provi-
sion.78 Nothing would prevent an American company or individual, for
example, from obtaining the enforcement of a judgment in a member-
state where the loser has assets in another Member State.79
C. UNCITRAL Model Rules
The most significant step toward de-localization at the national level
has come from the Model Rules developed by UNCITRAL and adopted
in 1985.80 Unlike the New York or Geneva Conventions, the Model
Rules were intended as new a lex loci arbitri for any state which decided
to adopt it.81 Thus, the provisions of the Model Rules do not generally
apply if the arbitration takes place in a foreign forum.82 However, courts
of Model Rules states must refer a dispute to arbitration even if the place
of arbitration is outside that state's territory.83 Such courts must recognize
and enforce an arbitral award "irrespective of the country in which it was
71 Id., Title IH.
78 Id., Title.l, § 1, art. 2.
79 See, e.g., John P. Fitzpatrick, The Lugano Convention and Western European Inte-
gration: A Comparative Analysis of Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe and the
United States, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 695, 697-99 (1993) (describing the harmonizing ef-
fects of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions on interstate jurisdiction in Europe). The
Lugano Convention, established by the Member States of the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation, "has extended the well established rules of the Brussels Convention (including
the case law of the ECJ) to EFTA countries." John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the
North American Free Trade Agreement: a Comparative Analysis of the Role ofRegional
Economic Institutions and the Harmonization of Law in North America and Western
Europe, 19 Hous. J. INT'LL. 1, n.403 (1996).
so The UNClTRAL Model Law was drafted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNC1TRAL) and adopted by the United Nations General As-
sembly in December 1985. G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at
308, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985), App. Doc. 7.
s MARTIN HUNTER ET AL., TBE FRESHFIELD'S GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND ADR, 32
(Kluwer 1993). Although, in the case of Europe, it would seem that the Model Law has
been more inspirational than legally effective. As of this point, only Scotch and British
arbitration laws have been largely based on the Model Law.
p See UNCITRAL Model Rules, supra note 80, art. 1(2). "The provisions of this
Law, except articles 8, 9, 35, and 36, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the terri-
tory of this State." Id.
3 See id. art. 8 (describing referral of arbitration agreement actions to arbitration).
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made., 8 4 Further, the court may attempt to provide interim protection,
whether or not the place of arbitration is within the Model Rules state.1
5
Model Rules parties are granted fundamental autonomy, in choosing
the procedural rules,86 the place of arbitration,87 timing,8 and the lan-
guage to be used in the proceedings.8 9 In the absence of agreement on
these issues, the Model Rules allows the arbitral tribunal to fill in the
gaps.
Further autonomy is granted in Article 28, which gives the parties
the right to choose the substantive law applicable to the dispute. 90 An
arbitral award must be in writing, must be signed by the arbitrators, and
must state the reasons upon which the award is based unless the parties
have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is on agreed
g4 See id. art. 35. "An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was
made, shall be recognized as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent
court, shall be enforced subject to the provisions of this article and article 35." Id.
85 See id. art. 9. "It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to
request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protec-
tion and for a court to grant such measure." Id.
86 See id. art. 19. "The parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the
arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings." Id.
87 See UNC1TRAL Model Rules, supra note, art. 1(2), art. 20. "The parties are free to
agree on the place of arbitration." Id.
88 See id. art. 21. "[A]rbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence
on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by
the respondent." Id.
89 See id. art. 22. "The parties are free to agree on the language or languages to be
used in the arbitral proceedings." Id.
90 See id. art. 28(1) "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with
such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dis-
pute." Id. Interestingly, the Model Law appears to exclude conflict of laws rules from
such choice, reserving that choice for the tribunal. See id., art. 28(2). "Failing any desig-
nation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict
of laws rules which it considers applicable." Id. art. 28(2).
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terms.9' A final award terminates the arbitral proceedings,9 subject to the
right of the parties to request correction or interpretation.93
A party may apply to the competent court to set aside an arbitral
award only if it can prove:
1. incapacity of the parties or invalidity of the arbitration agree-
ment,
2. improper notice or other lack of due process,
3. an award beyond the scope of the agreement to arbitrate,
4. improper arbitral procedure or composition of the arbitral
board,
5. that the award has been annulled or suspended or is otherwise
not binding,
6. that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settle-
ment by arbitration under the enacting state's laws, or
7. that the award is in conflict with the public policy of that
state.94
The Model Rules generally seek to limit judicial control during en-
forcement, allowing a court faced with a request to set aside an award to
contact the tribunal in an attempt to "eliminate the grounds for setting
aside."95 The final provisions of the Model Rules address recognition and
enforcement of awards, "irrespective of the country in which [they are]
91 See id. art. 31. "The award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the arbi-
trator or arbitrators .... The award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless
the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an award on
agreed terms." Id.
92 See UNCITRAL Model Rules, supra note 80, art. 1(2), art. 32. "The arbitral pro-
ceedings are terminated by the final award." Id.
93 See id. art. 33. "[A] party ... may request the arbitral tribunal to correct in the
award any errors in computations, any clerical or typographical errors or any errors of
similar nature .... [A] party... may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpreta-
tion of a specific point or part of the award." Id.
94 See id., art. 34(2) (following provisions found in Article V of the New York Con-
vention, and Article 5 of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration).
9' Id. art. 34(4).
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made., 96 Following the language of the New York Convention, recog-
nized grounds for refusing enforcement are the same as those for setting
aside an award.97
I. THE DE-LOCALIZATION MOVEMENT IN NATIONAL LAW
Typically, national laws play a potential role in a variety of areas
during the arbitration process: (1) the substantive law governing the is-
sues in dispute (lex contractus); (2) the law governing the capacity of the
parties to enter into an arbitration agreement; (3) the law governing the
arbitration agreement and the performance of that agreement; (4) the law
governing the existence and proceedings of the arbitral tribunal-the (lex
arbitri); and (5) the law governing recognition and enforcement of the
award. 98
Regarding the first area, the substantive law of the dispute, choice of
law clauses are commonly accepted in most adjudicatory traditions, and
do not present serious perils for the parties. This is said acknowledging
that the chosen law's Conflict of Laws regime might designate a different
law than that specified by the parties. Usually, however, the type of dis-
pute anticipated by the parties in their contract will be decided under the
system of law designated by the choice of law clause.' The remaining
categories fall under the title of procedural rules governing the arbitral
dispute, and present more difficult questions for those concerned with the
potential pitfalls of arbitration.
The instances when national legislation is likely to affect arbitral
proceedings most significantly are those involving a losing party that is
seeking to defend its non-compliance before the national court. Impor-
tantly, national legislation may allow for procedural challenges beyond
those acknowledged by the New York Convention and the Model Law.1i °
96 Id. art. 35.
97 See generally UNCITRAL Model Rules, supra note 80, art. 1(2), art. 36 (identify-
ing grounds for refusing enforcement of awards, including cases where an award is not
yet binding). Cf. id., art. 34 (identifying grounds for setting aside an award).
98 See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 2, at 72. As regards the latter, it may, "in prac-
tice, prove to be not one law, but two or more, if recognition and enforcement is sought
in more than one country in which the losing party has, or is though to have, assets." Id.
99 See, e.g., Bockstiegel, supra note 46, at 25 (stating that "the trend of modern na-
tional as well as international legislation on conflict of laws and on arbitration leans
clearly in the direction of a maximum of party autonomy").
100 Beyond public policy and arbitrability defenses, national laws may allow for chal-
lenges based on, for instance, the validity of the arbitration agreement, the form of the
award, deposit of the award, special treatment for arbitration of international disputes,
and timeliness of the claim. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 5, at 447, 449.
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Almost simultaneous to the adoption of the New York Convention
and the Model Rules, the nations of Europe began re-drafting their laws.
The motivations for re-drafting are complex and varied, but can generally
be described as states wanting to attract international commerce, 10 1 or
perhaps even the commerce of international arbitration itselfyu2 Changes
in national legislation tend to fall into two categories: (1) establishing
grounds for review, and/or (2) establishing the proper grounds for nullifi-
cation or enforcement. 03
A number of European countries have recently revised their laws to
accommodate the demands of international arbitration (including France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, England, and Scotland, as well
recent modifications in Italy and Germany). Generally, these laws have
demonstrated increased favor toward de-localized arbitral proceedings.
Meanwhile, several European nations still strictly apply their own proce-
dural law to all arbitral proceedings taking place within their country. 104
To determine how widespread the trend has become, and how the legisla-
tion has manifested itself in specific cases, it is useful to examine the na-
tional laws of countries which have moved toward de-localization, noting
the specific areas where legislative modifications will distinguish the
outcome of arbitral proceedings in that state from those in other states.
Advocates of de-localization have approved the Swiss and Belgian
statutes'05 as well as the new English Arbitration Act. x°6 These statutes,
and others like them, follow "the correct path to be followed in [the] fu-
ture," advocated in the 1980s. 107 This is not to say that any of these stat-
101 See Lecuyer- Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 3, at 601 n.115 (citing Emmanuel
Gaillard - "National legislators do not hesitate to state that their objective in enacting
new legislation is to enhance desirability of their country as a situs for international arbi-
tration").
102 See Park, supra note 17, at 689-90. Note, rather than terming the move towards de-
localization as a progression, Park refers to it rather as a laissez-faire attitude towards the
pitfalls of de-localization.
103 See id.
104 Though there is generally no presumption that this will be the case. See, e.g., ICC
ARBITRATION RULES, art. 15 (1998) (stating that "where these Rules are silent, by any
rules which the parties or, failing them, the Arbitral Tribunal may settle on, whether or
not reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to
the arbitration").
105 See Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 3, at 606.
106 See Bockstiegel, supra note 46, at 26.
107 Giorgio Bernini, Recent Legislation and International Unification of the Law on
Arbitration, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
CONFERENCE 315, 347 (Nabil Antaki & Alain Prujiner eds., 1985).
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utes, either in theory or in practice, is completely de-localized. There is
always a point beyond which the courts will not enforce an arbitral
award, Even if only in terms of defenses elaborated under the Brussels or
New York Conventions. The following examines the de-localization
trend found in recent legislative changes in several European states that
serve as popular sites for arbitration.OS
A. Austria
Austrian arbitration law1°9 leaves the parties large autonomy. Only a
few provisions cannot be waived by agreement. If the parties have stipu-
lated the application of a set of arbitration rules," these are in first in-
stance applicable as lex specialis. These regulations apply to domestic as
well as to international arbitral proceedings.
Under the old law, a difficult question arose as to whether Austrian
courts had jurisdiction to respond to party requests brought under the
Civil Procedure Statute (Zivilprozessordnung) (ZPO) when the only link
to Austria is the agreement to arbitrate in Austria (as in the appointment
of an arbitrator," the rescission of an arbitration agreement," 2 or the
setting aside of an award).1 3 This controversial issue was resolved in
1980 by the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) in the Nor-
solor case, where it assumed jurisdiction of Austrian courts in an arbitra-
tion between a French and a Turkish party which was held in Austria to
decide on an application to set aside the award."
4
108 See HUNTER ETAL., supra note 91, at 21-22.
109 The general statutory regulation of arbitration is contained in chapter four, entitled
"Arbitration Procedure - Arbitration Agreement," §§ 577-99 of the Austrian Code of
Civil Procedure. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] §§ 577-99 (Aus.), translated in [Binder
2, Release 98-4] INT'L COMM. ARB. (Oceana Publications, Inc.) at 10-17 [hereinafter
INT'L COMM. ARB.]. Note that §§ 577-99 are not applicable to valuation, which is a dis-
tinct process from arbitration under Austrian law.
110 Such as those of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Arbitral Centre of
the Federal Economic Chamber, Vienna, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, etc.
.. See § 582 (1) ZPO (Aus.), translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109.
112 See § 583 ZPO (Aus.), translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109.
113 See § 595 ZPO (Aus.), translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109.
114 This concept is codified in the 1983 amendments to the ZPO:
The application should be brought before the court which would have been compe-
tent to hear the dispute in first instance in the absence of an arbitration agreement;
however, if a court has been indicated in the arbitration agreement as being com-
petent for this purpose and if it would be possible for that court to be given compe-
tence by agreement of the parties (para.104 (1) and (2) Judicature Act), of if the
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As with most nations, some issues are not subject to arbitration (for
instance, matters concerning bills of exchange (Wechsel) are not arbitra-
ble). It is, however, possible to go to arbitration on the contract itself,
thus making the arbitration agreement separable. Other disputes leave
open an option for redress before the courts. For instance, disputes aris-
ing out of cartel agreements are in principle arbitrable. However, not-
withstanding the existence of an arbitral clause in a cartel agreement, cer-
tain disputes (in particular those containing a contractual penalty or puni-
tive measures imposed under the cartel agreement, or disputes concern-
ing its existence) may nevertheless be brought before the ordinary court
of law, unless the claimant has already effectively initiated the arbitra-
tion.115
The arbitrators will decide according Austrian law, unless the parties
have expressed a contrary intention, although the parties may authorize
the arbitrator(s) in writing to decide ex eaquo et bono (billigkeit).16 Par-
ties are free to specify their choice of law, substantive or procedural. 7
Section 594 (1) of the ZPO declares that an arbitral award has the
force of a final and binding court judgment between the parties, unless
the parties have provided in the arbitration agreement for the possibility
of appeal to second-level arbitral body.
Any party to the arbitration can request the chairman of the tribunal
(or if he is unable to act, any other arbitrator), to confirm the final bind-
ing nature (Rechtskraft) and the enforceability (Vollstreckbarkeit) of the
award.1 8 This confirmation is a prerequisite for the enforcement of a
domestic award in Austria." 9 Additionally, enforcement is by court pro-
ceeding. t2° Parties have three months12 ' to challenge an award before the
arbitration agreement indicates the venue of the arbitral procedure, then that court
is competent, or in the absence of such indication, the court under whose jurisdic-
tion this venue comes.
ZPO § 582 (Aus.), translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109.
15 See § 116(1) of the KARTELL GESETZ (Cartels Act) of November 22, 1972.
116 See supra note 1.
117 In absence of such an agreement, the arbitrators will determine the applicable law
on the basis of the rules of conflict which they deem reasonable. ZPO § 587 (Aus.),
translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109.
"s See § 594 ZPO (Aus.), translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109.
119 See SURVEY OFINTERNATIONALARBITRATIONSITES, 23 (J. Stewart McClendon ed.,
3rd ed., 1993).
120 See id.; § 594 ZPO (Aus.), translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109.
121 See § 596(2) ZPO (Aus.), translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109.
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a national court. 122Thus, while Austrian law prescribes an effective certi-
fication of the award by the arbitral tribunal, interaction with national
courts is minimal and left to the discretion of the parties until the point of
enforcement.
B. Belgium
Belgium modified its arbitration statute in 1985,123 two months be-
fore the promulgation of the UNCITRAL Model Rules. It may be re-
garded as the cutting edge in terms of de-localization of arbitration. It
provides:
The Belgian Court can take cognizance of an application to set aside
only if at least one of the parties to the dispute decided in the arbitral
award is either a physical person having Belgian nationality or residing
in Belgium or a legal person formed in Belgium, or having a branch or
some seat of operation there. ,24
If there is no Belgian connection, the losing party will not be able to
challenge in the Belgian courts an award made in international arbitration
proceedings sited in that country.'2 Therefore, a challenge can be made
only in countries where such an award is sought to be enforced (i.e., out-
side of Belgium). Therefore, Belgium would therefore seem to serve as a
choice forum for parties who are unafraid of the pitfalls of "arbitral anar-
chy. ' 126 As will be seen in part III, however, even Belgium's desire to
12 Grounds for setting aside an award include: invalid arbitration agreement, the in-
ability of a party to present its case, invalidity of the tribunal's composition, award was
improperly signed, justification of the award, unsupported rejection of an arbitrator chal-
lenge by the tribunal, or "incompatible with the basic principles of the Austrian legal
system." § 595 ZPO translated in INT'L COMM. ARB., supra note 109. See REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 2, at 325.
123 The Belgian law on arbitration, enacted in 1972, is found in part six of the Judicial
Code, articles 1676 to 1723. See GERECHTELIJK WETBOEK/ CODE JUDICARE (Belg.),
translated in MARCEL STORME & BERNADETTE DEMEUENAERE, INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION IN BELGIUM: A HANDBOOK 120-32 (1989) [hereinafter CCP]. Its
provisions are based on the uniform law set forth in the European Convention Providing
a Uniform Law on Arbitration, adopted in Strasbourg in 1966, under the aegis of the
Council of Europe. Belgium has been the only member country to ratify this convention.
124 CCP, art. 1717.4 (Belg.), translated in STORME & DEMEUENAERE, supra note 123.
12 "Regardless of whether the arbitrators took a bribe, exceeded their mission, or par-
ticipated in fraud against one of the parties." Park, supra note 9, at 128-29. See CCP. art.
1717(3) (Belg.), translated in STORME & DEMEUENAERE, supra note 123.
126 See Park, supra note 31, at 135, n.280.
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free parties from judicial review may be controlled by the ambit of E.U.
law. 127
C. Netherlands
In 1986, the Netherlands adopted legislation aimed at modernizing
its arbitration law. 12 Many of the changes reflect previous judicial at-
tempts at modernizing Dutch arbitration practice by means of decisional
law.129 The Dutch law does not adopt a distinction between domestic and
international arbitration. 13° Instead, the 1986 law attempts to liberalize
both domestic and international arbitration, while retaining the same ba-
sic procedural regime for both.'
31
127 See infra, section IV.
128 See 4 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. WETBOEKVANBURGERLIJKERECHTSVORDER-
ING [Rv.] art. 1020 (Neth.), translated in PIETER SANDERS & ALBERT JAN VANDENBERG,
THE NETHERLANDS ARBITRATION ACT 1986 (1987). The law added a new chapter, Book
4, entitled Arbitration, replacing older provisions on arbitration that had remained essen-
tially unchanged since enactment of the Code in 1838.
129 See generally SANDERS & VANDENBERG, supra note 128 (outlining improvements
to Rv. arts. 1020(2), 1022(2), 1036, 1054, 1037, 1046, 1051, 1060, 1050, 1069,1020(3)).
Primary enhancements are as follows:
Elimination of the distinction between submission and arbitral clause;
Interim measures of protection;
Enhanced party autonomy measures;
Place of arbitration and award left to the parties;
The right to petition the courts for consolidation of pending arbitrations;
Summary arbitration proceedings;
The power to correct and complete awards rests with the arbitral tribunal;
The parties have no right to court appeal on the merits; rather, the parties may
agree to some form of appellate body;
The tribunal may render an award on agreed terms; and
The tribunal may fill gaps in a contract.
Id.
130 Unlike, for instance, France, where arbitration having an international element is
treated as de-localized, with only limited judicial review available. The Dutch dropped
the distinction between national and "international" ("met en cause"), perhaps believing,
as some argue, that the distinction would be a source of confusion and delay. Even the
UNCITRAL Model Law art. 1(2) definition was disregarded. NOUVEAU CODE DE PRO-
CEURE CIVIL [N.C.P.C.], art. 1492 (Fr.), translated in GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL.,
FRENCH LAW: CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION ch. 7 (1994).
131 Although certain provisions of the 1986 law provide extended time limits when at
least one of the parties resides or is domiciled outside of the Netherlands. Also, the law
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Article 1054(2) of the Dutch Rv' 32 provides that, absent a choice of
law stipulation by the parties, the arbitrators shall make the award in ac-
cordance with the rules of law they consider appropriate. 33 Netherlands
law requires certification of awards by the District Court, 134 which will
generally be granted unless the award is found to be "manifestly contrary
to public policy." 135 Actions for setting aside the award may be brought
only after certification is granted by the court. 36 Thus, Dutch arbitration
supports a high level of party autonomy in structuring the proceedings,
but provides the parties with a broad range of available challenges.
D. France
French law on arbitration is set forth in the Nouveau Code de Proce-
dure Civile (French NCPC), enacted in 1806.137 Between its enactment
and 1980, the code remained essentially unchanged. Initiatives to amend
the French NCPC came about both as a result of France's increasing im-
portance as an international arbitral center, 138 and in response to France's
adherence to a number of multilateral arbitration conventions. 39 French
courts were frequently called on to adapt the antiquated code provisions
to modern arbitration practice, especially on the international level. In
also contains a separate title, Arbitration Outside of the Netherlands, devoted to foreign
arbitration agreements and the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards.
132 Similar to N.C.P.C. art. 1496 (Fr.), translated in BERMANNETAL., supra note 130.
133 See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 20, at 64 (discussing circumstances under which
punitive damages might be awarded).
" See 4 Rv. art. 1062(1) (Neth.), translated in SANDERS & VANDENBURG, supra note
128, at 36.
135 See id. art. 1063 (Neth.), translated in SANDERS & VANDENBURG, supra note 128,
at 37. A decision not to enforce may be appealed to the Court of Appeals and the Su-
preme Court.
136 See 4 Rv. art. 1062 (Neth.), translated in SANDERS & VANDENBURG, supra note
128, at 36-37. Thus also adopting the doctrine of competence-competence of arbitrators.
Grounds for setting aside include: lack of valid arbitration agreement; improper constitu-
tion of the arbitral tribunal; arbitrators did not comply with their mandate; award was not
signed or did not contain reasons; or award, or manner in which it was made, violates
public policy. See SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SITES, supra note 141, at 88.
Further available defenses are party fraud during the arbitration, forgery, or withholding
relevant documents. See id.; Rv art. 1068 (Neth.), translated in SANDERS & VANDEN-
BURG, supra note 128, at 43.
"7 N.C.P.C. (Fr.), translated in BERMANN ET AL., supra note 130.
1-1 I.e., the increasing number of awards being granted by the International Chamber
of Commerce in Paris.
139 Such as the New York Convention, supra note 66.
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1980 and 1981, arbitration legislation was enacted for the purpose of
codifying and redefining this case law,"40 and codifying the laissez-faire
attitude of the judiciary toward arbitral proceedings. a
Article 1494 of the French NCPC provides for general party auton-
omy regarding the arbitral procedure, while Article 1496 provides for
traditional party autonomy when choosing applicable substantive law.142
More importantly, French arbitration law was the first to substantially
increase the discretion of arbitrators by providing that, where the parties
have not agreed upon the rules of law to be applied, the tribunal shall
take into account the relevant trade usages and apply those rules of law it
deems proper in that context. 43
By drawing a distinction between domestic and international arbitra-
tion, 1 the French NCPC allows for a high level of de-localization in in-
ternational (but not all) arbitral proceedings. Meanwhile, in France, arbi-
trators can determine issues generally found non-arbitrable in many na-
tions, including those involving foreign patent validity, counterfeiting, or
licenses. 45 However, arbitral tribunals cannot declare a French patent
invalid because the tribunal would necessarily have to make determina-
tions of public policy and the rights of third parties.' 46 Commentators
differ with regard to whether even competition law and anti-trust disputes
are actually arbitrable in France.147
140 See CRAIG Er AL., supra note 5, at 483-85. The new arbitration law is found in
Book IV of the French CCP. See id. at 483. It provides separate regimes for domestic and
international arbitration imposing virtually no constraints on the latter beyond the exi-
gencies of international public policy. See id. at 496.
141 See id. at 483-84 (describing the codification of France's laissez-faire approach to
arbitral proceedings in the 1980 and 1981 Decrees).
14- See Yves Derains, France, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION 16, 21 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1984 & Supp. 1986) (describing party autonomy in
arts. 1494 & 1496).
"' N.C.P.C. art. 1496 (Fr.), translated in BERMANN ET AL., supra note 130, at 7-113.
See also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, International Commercial Arbitration: The Contri-
bution of the French Jurisprudence, 46 LA. L. REv. 1045, 1058 (1986).
'44 N.C.P.C. art. 1492 (Fr.), translated in BERMANNET AL., supra note 130, at 7-113.;
see, e.g., CRAIG ET AL., supra note 5, at 489, n.28 (quoting Mardele v. Muller et Cie,
"[whether the court applies domestic or international principles of arbitration] depends
less on judicial criteria than on the economic notion of 'international interests."').
145 See von Mehren, supra note 143, at 1058-59.
146 Decision forbidden to arbitral tribunals. N.C.P.C. art. 2060 (Fr.), translated in
BERMANNET AL., supra note 130, at 7-113. See Martin, supra note 61, at 945.
147 See Berthold Goldman, The Complementary Role of Judges and Arbitrators in
Ensuring that International Arbitration is Effective, in INTERNATIONAL ARBrRATION: 60
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The extreme de-localization of French law is evident in Article 1052
of the French NCPC, which provides the judiciary with only very narrow
bases for setting aside an award.14' The "a-national" spirit of French law
is further illustrated by its reference to "international public policy" vs.
merely "public policy," when enumerating the bases for annulment. 49
Certification by a national court is required for enforcement of an arbitral
award,150 which, if granted, is not subject to direct judicial review.' 5 '
National courts will review international arbitral awards in terms of
international standards, so long as the parties have provided for an exclu-
sion of French law. Thus, French law grants high levels of party auton-
omy, and assumes very high levels of tribunal competence - at least for
purely international arbitrations.
E. Switzerland 52
The Swiss Private International Law Act of 1987 (LDIP)153 provides
for generous levels of party autonomy in Articles 182 and 187.' Parties
YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE, 257, 270-71 (ICC Publishing S.A.
ed. 1984).
148 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 5, at 493-94:
1st
, if the arbitrator decided in the absence of an arbitration agreement or on the
basis of a void or expired agreement;
2 nd, if the arbitral tribunal was irregularly composed or the sole arbitrator irregu-
larly appointed;
3'd, if the arbitrator violated the mission conferred on him;
4 th
, if due process [literally, the principle of adversarial process] was not re-
spected;
5 h
, if the recognition or enforcement would be contrary to international public
policy (ordre public international).
Id.
149 See id. at 494-95 (comparing the bases for setting aside international arbitral
awards rendered outside France to those rendered by French courts).
150 Via a court order of Exequatur. N.C.P.C. arts. 1477, 1478 (Fr.), translated in BER-
MANN ET AL., supra note 130, at 7-110. Again, when ruling Exequator or Ex aequo et
bono courts look to principles of general fairness, rather than any specific national law.
151 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SITES, supra note 119, at 46 (citing arts.
1488. 1504 of the French Code Civile).
152 Note that, while Switzerland is not a Member State of the European Union, its
popularity as an arbitral site by E.U. Nationals, and possible applicability of E.U. law to
disputes arbitrated in that country make a review of its arbitration laws relevant to this
discussion. For an example of the potential applicability of E.U. law, see infra note 184.
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are free to specify their choice of law in all areas of the dispute. 55 How-
ever, absent such a specification, the arbitral tribunal will perform con-
tacts analysis to determine which forum's rules are most closely con-
nected with the dispute.1 56 Regarding arbitrability, the LDIP looks only to
whether the dispute involves "financial interests."'57
Swiss judges must hear international cases pursuant to a prorogation
agreement as long as one party resides in Switzerland and/or Swiss law is
applicable to the dispute.1 58 When both parties are Swiss residents, the
LDIP does not a11ly, and Swiss courts may apply the notion of forum
non conveniens, or the Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat.'6 Thus
Switzerland, like the France, retains separate regimes for international
and domestic arbitration. Under the Swiss federal Conflict of Laws, par-
ties to international commercial disputes can choose from cantonal law,
or limit court review procedural questions.
16 1
Complete autonomy is also an option, provided the parties have
concluded an explicit agreement to exclude court challenge, and both
parties reside outside Switzerland.162 Thus, the respect for party auton-
omy in Switzerland could result in an arbitration that takes place in Ge-
153 Loi FEDERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE [LDIP] (Switz.) (Federal Law on
Private International Law) (1987), translated in SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIoNALLAW31 (Pierre A Karrer et al., trans. Kluwar Law and Taxation Publishers 2d ed.
1994) [hereinafter, SwrrzERLAND'S PRIVATE LAW].
154 See PIERRE LALIvE ET AL., LE DROIT DE L'ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL
ENSUISSE 348, 387 (Lausanne 1989) (providing an annotated commentary on Art. 182 of
the LDIP).
155 See LDIP, art. 178(2) (Switz.), translated in SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE LAW, supra
note 153.
' See generally, e.g., Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 3.
157 Swiss Conflict of Laws provisions are contained in CODE CIVIL SuiSSE [Cc.] art.
177 (Switz.), translated in PIERRE A. KARRER & KARLW. ARNOLD, SWITZERLAND'S PRI-
VATE INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUTE 155 (1989); see Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra
note 3, at 608.
15' See Cc. art. 5 (Switz.), translated in KARRER & ARNOLD, supra note 157, at 32.
159 See Park, supra note 14, at 193.
160 See generally CRAIG ET AL. supra note 5, at 541-65 (comparing the LDIP and the
Concordat under Swiss law).
161 See LDIP art. 190(2) (Switz.), translated in SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE LAW, supra
note 154.
162 See Cc. art. 192 (Switz.), translated in KARRER & ARNOLD, supra note 180, at 165;
Park, supra note 31, at n.294. In such cases, the parties are free to choose both substan-
tive law and procedural rules governing the dispute. See Gotanda, supra note 20, at
n.155.
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neva, but follows United States substantive law and German procedural
law. 16
3
The code provides several grounds upon which awards may be chal-
lenged if the intent of the parties is unclear. 164 By default, the Federal
Supreme Court in Lausanne must hear the challenge of the award.
65
Court review may be excluded by an explicit agreement (dclaration ex-
presse) 166 under article 192 of the code, only if no party is a Swiss resi-
dent or has a permanent link with Switzerland.' 6 The explicit nature of
this claim is absolute - even if the default rules (such as those of the
I.C.C. or the London Court of International Arbitration) of the institution
conducting the arbitration bar judicial review - and only a statement by
the parties choosing those rules (or similarly exclusive rules) will bar
referral to the courts. 65
Thus, under Swiss federal procedure, parties have the choice of
placing themselves under a similar regime of "arbitral anarchy" found in
Belgium,'69 though the choice must be made explicitly.
163 See Gotanda, supra note 20, at n. 155.
164 As Professor Park says:
(i) irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal; (ii) an erroneous decision by the
arbitral tribunal with respect to its own jurisdiction; (iii) an award beyond the is-
sues submitted to the arbitrators, or the arbitrators'failure to decide claims within
the request for arbitration; (iv) failure to respect the principle of equal treatment of
the parties or the right to adversarial proceedings . . .; and (v) incompatibility of
the award with public policy (ordre public).
Park, supra note 31, at 185.
165 See id. The court must hear the challenge of the award "unless the parties have
expressly agreed to substitute review by the cantonal court of the arbitral seat." Id. If the
parties choose otherwise (e.g., cantonal procedure), the International Arbitration Con-
cordat adds "arbitrariness" and "clear violation[s] of law or equity" to the list of chal-
lenges. Id. The Intercantonal Concordat permits the court to hear an annulment request
"where it is alleged.., that the award is arbitrary in that it was based on findings which
were manifestly contrary to the facts appearing on the file, or in that it constitutes a clear
violation of law or equity." Id., n.296, citing the Swiss INTERCANTONAL CONCORDAT art.
36(f).
166 Park, supra note 36, at 696.
167 See id.
168 Park, supra note 36, at 696.
169 See Park, supra note 31 at 135, n.280.
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F. The United Kingdom
As stated above, English Arbitration Law prior to 1979 presented an
excellent model of a localized arbitration regime.'70 Historically, the
English judiciary was free to intervene at any point in the arbitral proc-
ess.' 7 1 Since the enactment of the 1979 law, English courts 72 have re-
mained empowered to hear appeals from an arbitrator's decision on mat-
ters of law, 73 but the parties have been allowed to provide exclusion
clauses that eliminate most judicial review of arbitration awards rendered
in international disputes (including interlocutory appeals on questions of
law arising in the course of the arbitration). The new Arbitration Act
1996 takes party autonomy to a new level.174 Its most general rulings
regarding procedure are found two sections:
Section l(b): the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are
resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public
interest;
and
Section 34(1): It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and
evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree to any
matter.
What follows in paragraph (2) of Section 34 is a list of such matters.
They show the fundamental changes the parties-and otherwise the arbi-
trators-may make to the usual procedure in England. The Arbitration
Act 1996 goes even further, giving the parties freedom to agree or dis-
agree to a broad range of issues.75 In most of these cases, if the parties
170 See generally Park, supra note 4, at 33-35 (discussing the "special case" procedure
under English law prior to 1979).
171 See Relaxation of Inarbitrability, supra note 24, at 1682 & n.133.
172 Scotland has its own arbitration regime, and has recently adopted the UNCITRAL
Model Arbitration Law.
173 See Park, supra note 31, at 183.
174 "hThe philosophy of the UNCITRAL rule pervades the 1996 act . V.V.
Veeder, Q.C., National Report England, [Supplement 23] 2 INT'L HANDBOOK ON COM.
ARB., at 3 (March 1997). See ARBITRATION ACT, 1996, (Eng.), reprinted in 5 INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV.UK (England) 2.c (Eric E. Bergsten ed., 1997)
[hereinafter ARBITRATION AcT 1996].
175 E.g., consolidation with other arbitral proceedings, concurrent hearings, representa-
tion by lawyers or other persons, appointment of experts or legal advisers, appointment
of assessors to assist on technical matters, any other power exercisable by the arbitral
tribunal, provision of security for the costs of the arbitration, the tribunal's power to give
directions in relation to any property, the power of the tribunal to order relief on a provi-
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have not expressly agreed upon such matters, a subsidiary competence of
the arbitral tribunal is established.
Finally, in Section 46, the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides for
the traditional autonomy of the parties to choose the law applicable to the
substance of the dispute, but with the addition that the parties may also
agree to have the dispute decided "in accordance with such other consid-
erations as are agreed by them or determined by the tribunal.' ' 176 Thus, as
the latest addition to the cadre of de-localized arbitral regimes, the Eng-
lish Arbitration embodies the spirit of modern (particularly post-Model
Rules) statutes, enabling international commercial disputants to tailor a
resolution that excludes all but the most fundamental challenges to arbi-
tral proceedings and awards.
IV. TOWARD UNIFORM DE-LOCALIZATION? E.U. CONSIDERATIONS
The law governing international commercial arbitration in European
nations has become increasingly de-localized in recent years, and this
trend is spreading. Unless the arguments in favor of localization are to be
disregarded entirely, one must ask whether "arbitral anarchy,' ' 77 legal
harmonization, 178 or some new form of European arbitral control 179 is
likely to emerge.
It is important to remember that none of the international accords
governing the validity of arbitral awards in force in Europe are function-
ally derived from the European Union.180 In fact, both the Commission
and the Court of Justice have demonstrated a surprisingly low level of
activism in governing the field of international commercial arbitration.' 81
The reluctance to embrace arbitration is, for instance, evidenced in the
sional basis, or powers of the tribunal in case of a party's failure to take certain necessary
procedural action.
176 See ARBITRATION ACT 1996 S.46, supra note 174.
177 See Park, supra note 17, at 690.
178 See Ronald A. Brand, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INT'L
ECON. L. (CCH) 1015, 1015 (Jan. 1991).
179 See, e.g., Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single
Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 29-34 (1986) (discussing the
future of international arbitration).
18o See Jean-Franqois Bourque, The Legal Framework of Arbitration in the European
Union, in ICC INT'L Cr. ARB. BULL. 8, 10-18 (International Commercial Arbitration in
Europe - Special Supplement 1994).
181 See generally id. at 18-25 (offering an excellent overview of the, albeit limited,
interplay between E.U. institutions and international commercial arbitration).
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Lugano Convention,' 82 where arbitration was explicitly excluded from
the scope of the accord.183 As with national laws, the primary questions
here are whether there are E.U. objectives to be honored in terms of Pub-
lic Policy and Arbitrability, and whether those objectives will trump the
desire by Member States'" to grant complete autonomy to the parties to
international commercial arbitrations.
A. Direct Effect and Challenges
Through its jurisprudence, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) es-
tablished the doctrine of "direct effect,"' whereby E.U. law will prevail
182 See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, art. I, 1988 O.J. L 319/9,28 LL.M. 620,623 (speci-
fying that the Convention does not apply to arbitration) [hereinafter Lugano Conven-
tion]. See also supra note 79 and surrounding text.
183 Article 1 reads:
This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature
of ,the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or
administrative matters. The Convention shall not apply to:
1. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in prop-
erty arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and suc-
cession;
2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insol-
vent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements,
compositions and analogous proceedings;
3. social security;
4. arbitration.
Lugano Convention, supra note 182, art. 1 (emphasis added).
184 Note, however, that even arbitrators sitting in non-Member States may choose or
feel compel to apply E.U. law as part of applicable supra-national or transnational public
policy. Thus a dispute arbitrated in Switzerland, might imply application of E.U. law as
part of Swiss law if the conflict has connections with an E.U. Member State, even if the
apparent intent of the parties was to avoid E.U. law. See Bourque, supra note 180, at 38-
42 (outlining three such situations where Swiss arbitral panels ranged broadly in their
interpretation of this question).
185 This doctrine flows from the famous line of cases developed by the ECJ during its
more activist phase, stating that "[t]he transfer by the States from their domestic legal
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a
subsequent unilateral act, incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot pre-
vail." Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425 (1964). See
Humblet v. Belgium 1960 E.C.J. 559, 560, 569;; Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A. 1978 E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (1978); see gener-
ally N.V. Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Neder-
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over individual national legislation where the latter is found to be incom-
patible with that of the European Union. The applicability of the "direct
effect" doctrine to the lex loci arbitri of member-states is best exempli-
fied by debates surrounding the passage of the 1996 English Arbitration
Act. In these debates, it became apparent that Part II of the Act (Domes-
tic Agreements) would be counter to Article 6 of the Maastricht Treaty,
because it would be "direct or indirect discrimination against foreign
citizens and legal persons of the European Union., 186 Similarly in Data
Delecta Aktiebolag,187 the ECJ found that a Swedish law which required
security to be furnished by foreign plaintiffs and pay costs if they lost
was contrary to Article 6 of the Maastricht treaty, stating:
[A] rule of domestic civil procedure, such as the one at issue in the
main proceedings, falls within the scope of the Treaty within the mean-
ing of the first paragraph of Article 6 and is subject to the general prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination laid down by that article in so far as it has an
effect, even though indirect, on trade goods and services between
Member States.'"
Thus, not only substantive laws of Member States must approximate
E.U. objectives, but so must procedural rules.189 This begs the question of
whether E.U. law is, by virtue of the "direct effect" doctrine, a part of
each Member State's lex loci arbitri, and whether arbitrators can or must
consult the ECJ on questions of E.U. law or policy.
The mechanics of appeal flow from Article 177 of the Treaty of
Rome.' 90 Through Article 177, the courts of Member States are encour-
landse administratie des belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration) 1963
E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105.
"6 22 Y.B. COM. ARB. 570 (1997).
187 See generally Case C-43/95, Data Delecta Aktiebolag v. MSL Dynamics Ltd., 1996
E.C.R. 1-4661, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 741 (1996) (describing how Article 6 of the E.C.
Treaty precludes a Member State from requiring a person from another Member State to
furnish security).
18 Id. at 1-4676.
189 Phillip Alexander Sec. v. Bamberger, (Eng. C.A. July 12, 1996), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Engcas File. "In cases concerning the European Union what
would best meet the predicament is a Directive defining the extent of the recognition
which the orders of the courts of each Member State are entitled to receive from the
courts of other Member States." Id.
190 "The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concern-
ing: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the
institutions of the Community; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established
by an act of the Council, where those statues so provide." Treaty Establishing the Euro-
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aged to seek advisory opinions on questions of E.U. law. In the Nordsee
case, the ECJ held that the language in Article 177 refers to state-
sponsored tribunals-not private international commercial tribunals,
even though they are sited in a Member State, 191 creating an quandary for
arbitral tribunals seeking guidance on the application of E.U. law or pol-
icy.
Meanwhile, the ECJ has also held that a national court reviewing an
arbitral award, even if it is asked for an ex aequo et bono'92 review of the
award, must determine whether the award would also be consistent with
E.U. policy:
It follows from the principles of the primacy of Community law and of
its uniform application, in conjunction with Article 5 of the Treaty, that
a court of a Member State to which an appeal against an arbitration
award is made pursuant to national law must, even where it gives
judgement having regard to fairness observe the rules of Community
law, in particular those relating to competition 93
pean Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter E.E.C.
Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R.
741, in Treaties Establishing the European Communities (E.C. Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
191 See Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefis-
cherei Nordstern AG & Co. KG 1982 E.C.R. 1095, 1095:
An arbitrator who is called upon to decide a dispute between the parties to a con-
tract under a clause inserted in that contract is not to be considered as a "court or
tribunal of a Member State" within the meaning of Article 177 of the Treaty where
contracting parties are under no obligation, in law or in fact, to refer their disputes
to arbitration and where the public authorities in the Member State concerned are
not involved in the decision to opt for arbitration and are not called upon to inter-
vene automatically in the proceedings before the arbitrator.
Id.
192 "[G]enerally, taking into consideration not only legal rules, but also what they be-
lieve justice, fairness, and equity directs ..... Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note
3, at 591; This concept is not to be confused with the arbitral role of amiable compo-
siteur:
(A] term of varied and not altogether precise meaning, used in continental legal
systems to refer to the power to decide a dispute without reference to any fixed
system of law. An arbitrator exercising such power is sometimes said to be decid-
ing ex aequo et bono, although it is not clear how congruent the Latin and French
expressions really are. Parties who authorize the arbitrator to act as an amiable
compositeur may be deemed to have waived the right to chaUenge the award.
Park, supra note 36, at 648 n.l.
193 Case C-393/92, Amelo v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij NV, E.C.R. 1-1477 (1994).
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Thus, though private arbitrators are not empowered to approach the
ECJ themselves on questions of E.U. law and policy, they are bound to
apply that policy. 194 Therefore, a national court opinion regarding a chal-
lenged arbitral proceeding or award will look to the jurisprudence of the
ECJ to make its decision. 19
Without access to the ECJ via Article 177, the arbitrator or the par-
ties to the dispute would need to present an effective interlocutory appeal
to the national court for a decision. This is the case even if the parties
have explicitly excluded review by the courts via contract, and even if
none of the parties is a national of the forum state. 196
B. Subsidiarity,197 E. U. Public Policy, and Arbitrability
The spirit of the European Union, found in the body of treaties that
constitute its fundamental "laws," is one of a harmonious, fair, and freely
flowing commerce. 198 As stated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, a major
objective of the Union is "to continue the process of creating an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken
as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of
194 See generally Jacomijn J. van Haersolte-van Hof, Decision of the European Court
of Justice, Dated April 27, 1994 In Case C-393/92, E.C.R. 1994, 1-1477,
Amelo/Ijsselmij, 6 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 83, 83-88 (1995).
195 As one German court stated in 1969:
[T]he [European Economic Community] rules of competition form part of the
'public policy' covered by Article 1041(1) (ii). Although the provisions of the
E.E.C. Treaty are part of so-called 'Community law,' with the entry into force of
the E.E.C. Treaty they have been adopted into the laws of the member-States and
must be applied by their courts. [Costa v. ENEL] Therefore, provided that they
concern the basis of the Common Market and have not merely been enacted out of
considerations of expediency, they form part of the doctrine of 'public policy' in
force in the Federal Republic.
Re 'Yoga' Fruit Juices (Case KZR 3/68) Kartellsenat of the Bundesgerichtshof [1969] 8
C.M.L.R. 123, 134-35 (1969) (emphasis added).
196 A relevant factor for disputants conducting arbitration in Belgium, Switzerland, or
England. Ironically, this creates another form of "statement of the case" - exactly the
form of arbitral procedure considered by archaic and counter-productive localization that
existed prior to the 1975 Arbitration Act.
197 Defined as requiring "[a] definite relationship between the goal of public interest
and the infringement on the private rights," in Pierre-Yves Tschanz, The Contributions of
the Aninol Award to the Law of State Contracts, 18 INT'L LAW 245, n.146 (1984).
198 As evidenced, for instance, by the introductory text of the Single European Act of
1986. See BULL. OF THE SINGLE EUR. COMM., Supp. 2/86.
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subsidiarity."'199 Conceptually, at least, the European Union is designed
to play an infrastructural role in the commerce and social welfare of
Europe, as opposed to a supra-national form of government." The con-
cepts of subsidiarity of the E.U. government and the supremacy of E.U.
law and policy, however, do not dovetail as well as, for instance, the
New York Convention does with national arbitral laws.
Perhaps in the spirit of subsidiarity, the Commission has resisted an
institutional embrace of international commercial arbitration. 2 1 Only
once has the Commission suggested that arbitrators should ask for guid-
ance on a specific arbitrability question (patent licensing).20 In that par-
ticular instance, the ICC objected to such a notification requirement, and
it was abandoned by the Commission in the final draft.2°3 Instead, the
ICC suggested that any control of arbitrators dealing with issues of com-
petition should be exercised by the courts at the time of enforcement of
the award, and that arbitral tribunals should have direct access to the
ECJ.2°4
Though the constitutive documents of the European Union are abun-
dant with policy statements which could reasonably be construed as pub-
lic policy, subject matters that restrict free trade are the most ripe for
concern by international commercial disputants. For example, the compe-
tition policy of the European Union, as elaborated in Article 85(1) of the
Treaty of Rome, forbids decisions and concerted practices "which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market." Such agreements or decisions are declared to be
199 See European Union: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Oct. 2, 1997,
Preamble, 37 I.L.M. 56, 67.
2M But see Nicholas Emilious, Subsidiary: Panacea or Fig Leaf?., in LEGALIssUES OF
THE MAAsTRIcm TREATY 65, 77-80 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1993)
(questioning whether subsidiarity can truly exist without clear institutional check and
balances to the power of the ECJ).
201 See generally Bourque, supra note 180 (underscoring the extremely few instances
where the commission has specified a proper role for commercial arbitration in the E.U.).
2 See Commission Regulation 2349/84, art. 9, 1984 O.J. L 219/15, at 22 (describing
the application of article 85(3) of the E.E.C. Treaty to certain categories of patent licens-
ing agreements).
23 See Sigvard Jarvin, The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers, in CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 50, 69 (Julian D.M. Lew ed.,
1986).
204 See id. This final proposal would make sense in the ICC, where the Court of Inter-
national Arbitration plays a quasi-appellate role to ICC arbitral proceedings and awards.
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"automatically void," 205 subject to express exemptions given from the
Commission (generally granted in particular areas of competition, rather
than to individual parties). The national courts must, therefore, review
the contract under arbitration both in terms of its own public policy and
arbitrability standards, as well as in terms of Article 85 of the treaty20
6
Thus, a losing disputant now has access to powerful non-
arbitrability and public policy defenses, even if the contract would suc-
cessfully de-localize the arbitration at a national level. 207 Although not
yet addressed by the ECJ, other possible arbitrability or E.U. policy de-
fenses are conceivable. Possible areas where a defense might be brought
under E.U. policy include industrial competition,2 community environ-
mental standards,2 9 community energy policy,210 transport policy, 211 em-
205 See E.E.C.Treaty, supra note 190, art. 85(2).
2 "Article 85 has direct effect and national courts are accordingly bound to apply it."
Marchant & Eliot Underwriting Limited v. Higgins [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 313, 323.
207 In Pigadis Siirl v Prodim SNC, the loser to an arbitral award brought an action for
the award to be set aside "on the ground that the franchise agreement, and therefore the
arbitration clause, was void as contrary first to public policy, and then to Article 85(1)
E.C." Pigadis Srl v. Prodim SNC, [1996] E.C.C. 277, 278 (Paris CA 1995). It is worth
noting that the French Cour d'appel found that "[for Community law to be applicable to
the agreement, the requirement that it affects trade between Member States must be ful-
filled. Practices which do not appreciably affect trade are outside the ambit of Article
85(1) even if the quantitative thresholds set by the Commission are exceeded," setting a
fairly high bar to the application of Article 85. Id. at 281.
2s See E.E.C. Treaty, art. 130 and art. 100A.
20 See id. art. 100a, 130r-130t.
210 See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
arts.3 (general objectives), 57-64 (production and prices), 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter
ECSC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25,
1957, arts. 40-76 (investment, joint undertakings, and supplies), 91-100 (the nuclear
common market), 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty]; Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 30-37 (trade), 85-99 (competition), 95-99
(taxation), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573[hereinafter E.C. Treaty]. See also E.E.C. Treaty, supra
note 190, Title XIII (discussing trans-European networks).
211 Articles 3e, 74, and 75 of the EEC Treaty require the Community institutions to
establish a common policy in the field of transport and Articles 61 and 75 to 84 include
various provisions relating to questions of transport policy. See E.E.C. Treaty, supra note
190, arts. 3(e), 61, 74, 75, 84. Articles 129b-129d cover Trans-European Networks. See
id., art. 129 (b)-(d).
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ployment and social policy, 212 internal market policies, 213 and economic
policy. 21
4
V. CONCLUSION: RELAThVE AND LONG-TERM IMPORTANCE
European nations that have recently or are in the process of adopting
arbitration laws have tended to favor a de-localized, pro-autonomy ap-
proach to the law. This means that the situs of arbitral proceedings mat-
ters less, and maximum party autonomy is generally found in any of the
nations which have updated their arbitral laws in the last two decades.
Traditional safety nets incorporated into the process which compensate
for lower levels of predictability between the parties, have been mini-
mized in favor of freeing and attracting commerce.
As Europe nears both the turn of the century and the milestones re-
lated to the ultimate deepening of the European Union come and go (e.g.,
fiscal and monetary integration), a number of changes in the landscape of
international commercial arbitration beg the question of whether the
European Union will become a breakwater for the de-localization trend.
Since 1996 most major independent arbitral organizations have both re-
drafted their international arbitration rules, including the ICC, 215 the
London Court of International Arbitration,21 6 and the American Arbitra-
tion Association.217 With such widespread changes, the use of interna-
tional commercial arbitration is only more likely to increase. Further, by
creating more substantive law that will have a direct impact on European
212 See generally E.E.C. Treaty, arts. 2, 3, 39, 48-51, 100-02, 117-27, 130a-e and 235
(noting various provisions that attempt to foster freedom of movement for employment
purposes and for the harmonization of social systems).
213 E.C. Treaty fundamental provisions: Preamble and art. 2 (part of Community ob-
jectives) and 3 (among Community policies and actions), art. 7a (definition), arts. 8a, 48
ff. (free movement of persons) art. 30 ff. (free movement of goods), art. 59 ff. (freedom
to provide services), art. 52 ff. (freedom of establishment), art. 73b-g (free movement of
capital). See E.C. Treaty, supra note 210, Introduction, arts. 2, 3, 7a, 8a, 30, 48, 52, 59,
73b-g. Main legal bases for secondary legislation relating to these five freedoms: See id.
arts. 8a, 54(2), 57(2), 66, 73c, 75, 99, 100, 100a, 100b and 100c. See id. arts. 8a, 54(2),
57(2), 66, 73c, 75, 99, 100, 100a-c.
214 See id. arts. 3a (2-3), 67-73, 102a, 103, 103a, 104, 104a, 104b, 104c, 105-109m.
215 See International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.iccwbo.org/html/rules-
english.htm>.
216 See LCIA Arbitration International, Rules and Costs: Recommended Clauses (vis-
ited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/town/squarte/xvc24/rulecost.htm>.
217 See American Arbitration Association, InternationalArbitration Rules (visited Feb.
25, 1999) < http://www.adr.org/rules/international-arb-rules.html>.
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commerce, it will be in the interests of both the disputants and the Euro-
pean Union for questions regarding those laws to be settled uniformly
and in a way that makes their selection as applicable law attractive to
disputants.
Additionally, as Europe undergoes the next stages of "deepening,"
commercial uniformity may assume a new importance.1 9 More fluid
communication between the E.U. administration and arbitrators would
seem a requisite element of the effective enforcement of E.U. law in pri-
vatized justice.
If the evolution toward de-localization becomes an effective pan-
European localization (via enforcement of the laws and policies of the
European Union) then perhaps completely unfettered party autonomy is
not possible in Europe. Meanwhile, it does not seem, in the short-term,
that the laws and policies of the European Union will present fans of lo-
calization with effective defenses in arbitral proceedings, based on the
one-way relationship between the E.U. government and arbitral fora. As
the spirit of harmonization increases, it is not unreasonable that standards
of arbitrability and public policy within the Member States will also need
to bear a closer resemblance to a single European standard, similar to the
commercial harmonization mandated by the ECJ in the area of product
standards in the 1970s.220
The choice of a European forum creates a factor to be considered,
along with the full range of alternatives available to commercial dispu-
tants.22' Where the predictability of the dispute is low, it may make sense
that the parties seek a non-binding solution (evaluative of the law and the
facts of the dispute) before committing to an extra-judicial proceeding
that may fall short of their intentions, either for autonomy or protection.
As always, the onus remains on the parties to international commer-
cial contracts to make the most complete risk assessment they can, at-
218 See, e.g., European Commission, Commission on Contract Law, The Principles of
European Contract Law 1997 (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://ananse.irv.uit.no/
tradelaw/doc/EU.Contract.Principles. 1997.preview.html>.
219 See, e.g., Leslie Williams, Current Legal Developments in the European Union, 18
WHTiTER L. REV. 307, 307-08 (1997).
m0 For an excellent example of the harmonization of product standards, see the "Cas-
sis Dijon" case of 1978. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwal-
tung ffir Branntwein [1979] E.C.R. 649.
221 For instance, though the body of international legal literature focuses almost exclu-
sively on arbitration, other methods and fora (such as mediation, mini-trials, and various
forms of early neutral evaluation) are available to the parties. Mediation, being purely
completely consensual, does not incur the duty to observe E.U., or (for that matter "any")
law.
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tempting to determining whether it serves their purposes to lock into ar-
bitral proceedings and if so, whether it makes sense to choose a forum
where higher levels of judicial review are available. For the time being,
the larger choice of the European Union as a "super-situs" for arbitration
must figure into this calculation, even if the exact impact of that choice
remains to be seen.

